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Abstract 
 
Controls on human mobility and efforts to undermine them continue to shape South Africa’s 
politics, economy, and society. Despite the need for improved policy responses to human 
mobility, reform is hindered by lack of capacity, misinformation, and anti-migrant sentiments 
within and outside of government. This report outlines these trends and tensions by providing a 
broad overview of the limited demographic and socio-economic data available on migration to 
and within South Africa. Doing so highlights the spatialised aspects of human mobility, trends 
centred on and around the country’s towns and cities. It also finds significant development 
potential in international migrants’ skills and entrepreneurialism. By enhancing remittances and 
trade, non-nationals may also expand markets for South African products and services. Despite 
these potential benefits, there are severe obstacles to immigration reform. These include a 
renewed South African populism; the influence of a strong anti-trafficking lobby; a European 
Union (EU) agenda promoting stricter border controls; poor implementation capacity; and 
endemic corruption among police and immigration officials. There are different, but equally 
significant problems in reforming frameworks governing domestic mobility including 
perceptions that in-migration is an inherent drain on municipal budgets. Recognising these 
limitations, the report concludes with three recommendations. (1) A conceptual reconsideration 
of the divisions between documented and undocumented migrants; between voluntary and forced 
migrants; and between international and domestic migration. (2) An analytical respatialisation in 
future planning and management scenarios involving regional and local bodies in evaluating, 
designing and implementing policy. (3) To situate migration and its management within global 
debates over governance and development and for ‘migration mainstreaming’ into all aspects of 
governance. The success of any of these initiatives will require better data, the skills to analyse 
that data, and the integration of data into planning processes.  
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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The challenge for South Africa is to formulate policy that takes advantage of 
the positive aspects of globalization, including the unprecedented movement of 
people with skills, expertise, resources, entrepreneurship and capital, which 
will support the country’s efforts at reconstruction, development and nation-
building. 
 
Republic of South Africa, White Paper on International Migration (1999) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
South Africa’s current politics, economy, social formations have been shaped by the elaborate 
regulation of human mobility. From its foundation, the majority of its residents, citizens and non-
nationals, faced stark limitations on where they could live and own land and when and how they 
could move. The system of control was never as absolute or incorruptible as many imagine, but 
those who disobeyed state regulation did so at considerable risk. As the apartheid state’s power 
waned in the late 1980s, so too did formal restrictions on movement into and within South 
Africa. With the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa’s previously 
forbidden cities became primary destinations for migrants from around the country. Over time, 
they have become increasingly important nodes for migrants from around the continent and 
beyond seeking profit, protection, and the possibility of onward passage. Human mobility in all 
its forms continues to transform the country’s population and economy as never before. 
As the May 2008 violence against foreigners so starkly illustrates, domestic and 
international mobility are not without significant risks to human security and the country’s 
developmental trajectory. However, the country will not meet its short and long-term 
development targets without significant migration of skilled and semi-skilled labour. Despite the 
evident need to build an effective system to monitor and address human migration, the South 
African government and civil society possess perilously limited capacity to improve migration 
management and ensure the peaceful integration of migrants into development processes. 
Moreover, the domestic and regional benefits of mobility are often hidden by concerns over 
fears—of uncontrollable cities and citizens’ economic and physical security—and efforts to 
protect the human rights of relatively small number of refugees, asylum seekers, and trafficking 
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victims. Efforts to shift the terms of these discussions are further hindered by widespread anti-
immigration sentiment in and outside of government.  
This report proceeds through three phases in exploring these trends and tensions. It 
begins by providing a broad overview of the demographic and socio-economic data available, 
appraising the quality of knowledge it offers on contemporary migration flows to and within 
South Africa, and briefly assessing the limitations in methods and resources and identifying the 
gaps to be filled. It then offers an overview of the main policy transformations at both national 
and local levels, highlighting two sets of tensions: between the country’s immigration and 
asylum regimes; and between regional integration and South Africa’s nationalistic self-interests. 
The overview finishes by clarifying the main governance and human development challenges by 
looking at two core issues: the integration of international migrants into local communities and 
the local governance of migration in contexts of extreme vulnerability and resource competition.  
The report ends by considering the viability of an approach to development drawn from 
Amartya Sen’s pioneering work on capabilities and entitlements. Although convinced that South 
and Southern Africa would benefit from expanding migrants’ choices and agency in the 
development process as his framework suggests, there are severe limitations on implementing 
such an approach. In the midst of global economic crisis and heightening domestic populism, 
there are acute obstacles to reforming the country’s immigration system in ways that promote 
long-term regional development outcomes. The challenges are heightened by the influence of a 
strong anti-trafficking lobby and the European Union (EU). The anti-traffickers, led by the 
International Organisation for Migration, continue to frame migration management as a concern 
for law enforcement. Similarly, the recent EU-South Africa dialogue on migration is more likely 
to entrench a border control approach than one informed by regional development priorities. One 
must also recognise the limited influence of public policy on practice. With poor implementation 
capacity and endemic corruption within the police and border officials, state policy of any kind is 
unlikely to achieve its desired effects, whatever those may be. 
Accepting these limitations, the report nevertheless makes three recommendations for 
improving migration policy and management. First, it calls for a reconsideration of the divisions 
between documented and undocumented migrants; between voluntary and forced migrants; and 
between international and domestic migration. Such divides have produced policy silos with 
little coordination among agencies charged with law enforcement, status determination, 
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documentation, social assistance, or local development. With South Africa’s patterns of mixed 
migration, there is a need to develop bureaucratic and planning mechanisms to address human 
mobility more broadly.  
Second, it calls for an analytical respatialisation in future planning and management 
scenarios. While recognizing national government’s important role, there is a need to enhance 
the role of local governments and regional bodies in evaluating, designing and implementing an 
approach to human mobility. Migration and development vary across both space and time. Any 
policy approach that fails to disaggregate migration according to these variables is unlikely to 
fully realise its objectives. 
Third, it argues that there is much to learn from situating discussion on migration and its 
management within the broader global debate over governance and development. With a move 
away from universally prescriptive approaches to governance, international actors like the UNDP 
and its pioneering Human Development concept in 1997, the European Commission’s 2006 
Strategic Paper on Governance and Development, the World Bank’s 2007 Paper on 
Strengthening World Bank Group (WBG) Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption 
(GAC) and bi-lateral approaches suggest the need to develop migration and development 
frameworks based on a country’s specificities. As of yet, few international actors (let alone the 
South African Government), have applied this approach to governance to migration, an area still 
dominated by security concerns ill adapted to development challenges. If nothing else, the report 
suggests that foreign assistance and domestic policy reforms push for ‘migration mainstreaming’ 
into all aspects of governance. In a country where international and domestic mobility remains so 
demographically and politically important, the success of any development initiative must 
overtly consider the country’s population dynamics. As part of this process, the government 
should identify and understand the root causes of the negative by-products of human mobility–
corruption, human rights abuses, labour competition—and begin developing ways to help reduce 
them rather than rely on the false premise that it can and should totally control mobility.  
In concluding, the report notes that, should the political obstacles be removed, any effort 
to incorporate migration into long-term policy and governance systems will require better data 
and integration of data into planning processes. At present, there are few skills within or out of 
government for collecting, monitoring, and analysing migration data. This gap becomes ever 
more acute at the regional level. Without the ability to describe human mobility and evaluate 
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policy’s current and potential impacts, policies are likely to fail in ways that help realise many 
planners’ current fears about the effects of human mobility on prosperity, security, and 
development. 
 
Data Sources and Approach 
 
In an effort to move beyond the demographic and quantitative fixations of much of the migration 
and development literature, this study embeds demographic and economic trends within broader 
socio-political formations. In doing so, it draws on an ecumenical set of data in illustrating the 
intersections between human mobility and development in South Africa. This includes 
considerable participant observation in national, local, and regional migration-related discussions 
and new survey research together with formal and informal interviews with migrants, service 
providers, advocates, and local and national government representatives in Johannesburg, 
Pretoria, Cape Town and elsewhere. In a number of instances, it also calls on a survey the FMSP 
conducted with 847 respondents in seven central Johannesburg neighbourhoods (Berea; 
Bertrams, Bezuidenhout Valley, Fordsburg, Mayfair, Rosettenville, and Yeoville). Of these, 
29.9% (253) were from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 24% (203) from 
Mozambique; 22% (186) from Somali; and 22.4% from South Africa (190) (the remaining 1.8% 
were from other countries mistakenly included in the sample.) The sample was 59.7% male, 
generally reflecting official estimates of the inner-cities demographic composition (SACN 2006). 
These data are by no means representative of South Africa’s ‘migrant stock’ or of the host 
population. However, they do provide critical illustrations of trends and points where migration 
and development intersect. In order to make broader claims, we also draw on the 2001 South 
African Census and the 2007 National Community Survey, both conducted by Statistics South 
Africa (StatsSA). The latter generated a nationally representative sample of all South African 
residents but does not provide all of the spatial and demographic details afforded by the 2001 
census.1 In all instances, we work from the position that social and political understandings of 
human mobility are as important as actual movements in determining development outcomes.  
 
                                                     
1 More information on the 2001 census and the 2007 community survey are available from the Statistics South Africa 
website (http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/populationstats.asp). The authors are grateful to Veronique Gindrey 
for her contributions to the statistical analysis included in this report.  
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Contemporary Migration to South Africa: Numbers that Matter 
 
 Scholars often explain migration with reference to the three ‘D’s’: demography, 
development, and disparities. Indeed, all available evidence suggests that the primary reason for 
migration to and within South Africa is due to variations in economic opportunities within the 
country and the region. A more nuanced analysis of migration motivations and trends also points 
to the three ‘P’s. While the majority come seeking ‘Profit’, others come seeking ‘Protection’ 
from political or domestic persecution, natural disasters, or violence. A last group arrives in 
South Africa seeking ‘Passage’: onward movement to a final destination elsewhere. In many 
cases, their termini are outside Africa, typically Europe, North America, and Australia. A small 
number also use South Africa to transit to Mozambique and Swaziland.  
No one knows how many international migrants are in South Africa, how long they have 
been there, how long they stay, or what they do while they are in the country. Despite rapid 
changes in migration patterns, the South African government has largely failed to establish data 
collection mechanisms that can inform pragmatic migration and development policies. Instead, 
current policies continue to render most international migration bureaucratically invisible. Rather 
than building mechanisms to plan for population movements, South African discussions around 
migration policy during the 1990s and early 2000s have struggled over the evidence needed to 
make sound choices and evaluate the impact of past decisions. In almost all instances, official 
figures on both domestic and international migration and its effects raise significant questions of 
data quality. Such weakness is tied to two factors: (1) the difficulty in accurately measuring 
migration given the country’s extended borders, poor data on the South African population, and 
mixed migrations within, into, and out of the country; and (2) migration’s association with highly 
politicized issues surrounding nation-building, citizenship and belonging.2 Consequently, the 
information presented below provides only rough quantitative estimates of who is coming and 
where they are going. We complement these with a qualitative overview of migration patterns 
into, within, and through the country.  
 
 
 
                                                     
2 For more on these connections, see Landau 2006. 
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How Many Are Coming and Where Are They Going? 
 
While cross border migration has undeniably increased over the last decade (see Figure 1), 
overall figures are far lower than most South African officials and citizens presume. Moreover, 
even in the most immigrant-rich parts of South Africa, the number of newly arrived non-
nationals is dwarfed by the number of recently arrived citizens. The most recent South African 
census (2001) found only 477,201 foreign born residents out of a total of close to 45 million. 
Due to sampling errors, the state statistics agency (Statistics South Africa or Stats SA) later 
revised estimates to between 500,000 and 850,000. These numbers have climbed since the 2001 
census because of relatively strong economic growth in South Africa, regional integration, and 
the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe. According to the 2007 Community Survey, a national 
representative survey conducted by StatsSA, the total number of foreign-born residents is just 
over 1.2 million or 2.79% of the total population. It is unclear how much of the increase since 
2001 is due to improved sampling or an actual increase. Although there are suggestions that 
StatsSA has again undercounted non-nationals—as they have undercounted the homeless and 
other marginalised groups—there have been no serious or scholarly challenges to findings from 
the Community Survey. Despite such evidence, there are regular claims by officials that 2-3 
million Zimbabweans now live in South Africa. Empirical research in destination areas and 
elsewhere in the country suggest that these numbers are ill-informed exaggerations (see Makina 
2007: 5). Claims that there are 8-10 million ‘undocumented’ migrants in the country are equally 
overstated.3  
 
  
                                                     
3 See Forced Migration Studies Programme and Musina Legal Advice Office (2007).  
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Figure 1 
Numbers of Arrivals of Temporary Residents between 1990 and 20054 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Tourism and Migration, 1984-2007. (Statistics 
unavailable for 1992-1994 and 1996-1997). 
 
As in destination countries around the world, the total number of non-nationals living in South 
Africa is a mix of documented and undocumented migrants along with refugees and asylum 
seekers. As Figure 1 indicates, the number of temporary work, study, business, and tourist 
permits granted annually has consistently increased since the end of apartheid. (The overall 
number of temporary permits and visas thus went from 3.0 million to 9.9 million between 1992 
and 1999.)  During the same period, permanent immigration permits went from 14,000 a year in 
1990, to 4,000 at the end of the 1990s. The number then rebounded to around 10,000 a year by 
2004.5 Temporary permits and visas are also increasingly granted to Africans. There has been an 
effort to increase the number of ‘exceptionally skilled’ migrants attracted to South Africa 
through the general work permit, a (skills) quota work permit, an intra company transfer work 
permit, treaty permits, as well as corporate permits. There are few statistics available on the 
                                                     
4 Temporary residents include entries for reasons of work, study, business, holiday, contract, border traffic, transit, 
and other unspecified categories. 
5 Department of Home Affairs, Annual Reports, 1990-2004. 
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numbers of people recruited under these schemes although it is clear that the numbers fall short 
of government set targets (see Table 12, far below).  
 There is also a relatively small, but expanding, number of refugees and asylum seekers 
among the non-nationals living in South Africa. For reasons discussed further below, the number 
of asylum seekers has grown far faster than that of refugees. According to the Department of 
Home Affairs, there were 170,865 asylum seekers at the end of 2007 compared to 36,736 people 
who had been recognised as refugees under the 1998 Refugees Act (implemented in 2001). 
Many of this latter category may have now left South Africa or regularised their stay through 
other means (including buying South African citizenship). Similarly, the number of asylum 
seekers undoubtedly includes people who have filed multiple applications (often because the 
DHA has misplaced their records) or who have left the country or applied for other permits. 
Despite these qualifications, the global figures would likely be far higher if the South African 
government had not effectively prohibited Zimbabweans from making asylum applications 
before 2006 or had provided a mechanism for Zimbabweans to apply for asylum without first 
travelling to Pretoria or Johannesburg. (Following the recognition that Zimbabweans had every 
right to apply for asylum, Zimbabweans immediately topped the asylum seeker table.) Many 
Zimbabweans continue to seek protection although the South African government has recognised 
few—including victims of torture—as refugees. Compared to 33,351 pending applications at the 
end of 2007, only 477 Zimbabweans were granted refugee status (see Tables 1-3). 
 
Table 1 
Cumulative Numbers of Numbers of Refugees and Asylum Seekers6 
  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Refugees 18,605 23,344 26,558 27,683 29,714 35,086 36,736
Asylum 
Seekers 
4,860 52,451 84,085 115,224 140,095  131,107 170,865
Total 23,465 75,795 110,643 142,907 169,809 167,193 207,601
 
  
                                                     
6 Before the 2001 implementation of the Refugees Act (passed in 1998), there were officially no refugees or asylum 
seekers in South Africa.  
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Table 2 
Asylum Numbers at a Glance (2007) 
 
New Asylum Applications in 2007 45,673 
Number of New Asylum Applications Decided in 
2007 
5,879 
Percentage of Applicants Given Refugee Status 29% 
New Backlog in Asylum Cases in 2007 39,758 
Pre-2007 Backlog in Asylum Cases 49,275 
Total Asylum Case Backlog +89,000 
 
 
Table 3 
Asylum Applications from Selected Countries (2007) 
 
Zimbabwe 17,667
Democratic Republic of the Congo 5,582
Ethiopia 3,413
Malawi 3,341
Somalia 2,041
Bangladesh 1,982
Pakistan 918
 
While smuggling remains an important, if exploitative and occasionally dangerous, part of the 
border economy, there is little evidence of widespread human trafficking into South Africa. 
Indeed, an in-depth two-year study by the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria has found few 
non-nationals in precisely those sectors identified by the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) and others as primary destinations for victims of trafficking (Gould 2008). IOM’s multi-
million dollar, multi-year regional counter-trafficking programme has identified few victims 
(Private Communication with IOM employees 2007 and 2008). However, this has not stopped 
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the IOM from publicly claiming that there are thousands of people being trafficked into South 
Africa by organised crime (IRIN 2008b).7 
 
Removals and Deportation 
 
Understanding migration dynamics in South Africa also draws attention to the long-standing and 
elaborate (if expensive and ineffective) system of arrests and deportations. Under the 2002 
Immigration Act, police or immigration officers may remand people to custody without a 
warrant if they have reasonable grounds to believe they are not entitled to be in the Republic of 
South Africa. Immigration officers are also empowered to arrest illegal foreigners and deport 
them. In theory, the Immigration Act provides a range of procedural limitations on enforcement 
activities. These include provision of adequate opportunity for suspects to claim asylum, rights to 
appeal administrative actions, and time limits on detention for the purposes of deportation. 
Research by Wits University and Lawyers for Human Rights has found that in many—if not 
most—cases, police detain and deport people without full respect for the rule of law. In some 
instances, this includes arresting people waiting to apply for asylum, who have recently crossed 
the border into South Africa from Zimbabwe, and, in at least one instance, who are seeking 
shelter in a police station after fleeing xenophobic violence. Consequently, the past years have 
seen a significant increase in the number of deportations from South Africa.  
 
  
                                                     
7 In preparing this report, the authors discovered that IOM has removed most of the documents ostensibly 
substantiating claims of widespread trafficking within the region from its South African website. 
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Figure 2: 
Deportations from South Africa 1990-2006 
 
Source: Department of Home Affairs Data Reproduced in CORMSA 2008 
 
The main reason for the rise in the number of deportations has been the heightened activity of the 
police in immigration enforcement. The majority of those deported in most recent years are 
people arrested soon after crossing the Zimbabwe-South Africa. These regularly include would-
be asylum seekers and unaccompanied minors. Some are returned to an International 
Organisation for Migration centre in Musina, Zimbabwe. The majority are simply left on the 
Zimbabwean side of the border. The other primary groups being deported include those from 
Mozambique (the majority until 2004) and Lesotho. 
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Spatial Distribution 
 
As discussed briefly earlier, there are distinct spatial dynamics to both international and domestic 
migration in South Africa. In previous decades, much of the international migration concentrated 
in agricultural and mining areas. Since the early 1990s, both international and domestic migrants 
are increasingly concentrated in the country’s urban centres (see Figure 3 and Table 4).  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Note: Map developed by Forced Migration Studies at Wits with UNOCHA (Pretoria) 
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Province Population Foreign-born 
Percentage 
of foreign-
born 
Non-
Nationals 
Percentage 
of non-
Nationals 
Western Cape 5,278,585 170,019 3.22 40,835 0.90
Eastern Cape  6,527,747 40,182 0.62 14,620 0.23
Northern Cape 1,058,060 19,406 1.83 1,895 0.23
Free State 2,773,059 83,088 3.00 27,995 1.03
KwaZulu-Natal 10,259,230 98,237 0.96 38,717 0.41
North West 3,271,948 116,929 3.57 50,773 1.39
Gauteng 10,451,713 578,387 5.53 212,715 2.41
Mpumalanga 3,643,435 101,534 2.79 35,822 1.15
Limpopo 5,238,286 60,541 1.16 41,074 0.78
South Africa 48,502,063 1,268,324 2.61 464,446 1.04
Source: StatsSA (2007) Community Survey 
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Table 4 
The Matrix of Origin of Migrants between Provinces 2001-2007 
Destination 
Province 
Percent from Province of Origin 
All Regions 
WC EC 
N
C 
FS 
KZ
N 
NW GP
M
P 
LP 
Western Cape 
(WC) 
0 54 5 3 7 1 25 2 3 
100 
(N=197,212) 
Eastern Cape 
(EC) 29 0 5 8 19 2 31 3 3 
100 
(N=85,392) 
Northern Cape 
(NC) 20 6 0 10 3 43 17 1 1 
100 
(N=46,054) 
Free State (FS) 6 18 10 0 8 14 34 4 4 
100 
(N=67,832) 
KwaZulu-Natal 
(KZN) 6 45 2 4 0 3 29 8 3 
100 
(N=124,276) 
Northwest (NW) 3 16 4 15 4 0 40 6 12 
100 
(N=152,933) 
Gauteng (GP) 6 11 2 7 17 16 0 15 27 
100 
(N=609,169) 
Mpumalanga 
(MP) 2 7 1 6 13 5 27 0 39 
100 
(N=128,903) 
Limpopo (LP) 3 5 1 5 3 11 45 26 0 
100 
(N=7,1269) 
Source: Stats SA, Community Survey 2007 
 
This is most evident in Gauteng Province. Although the smallest of South Africa’s nine 
provinces (less than 2% of the landmass), it contributes close to 34% of its gross domestic 
product. This represents close to 10% of the GDP for sub-Saharan Africa.8 By far the most 
urbanised population, it is also the most cosmopolitan. In Statistics South Africa’s 2007 
Community Survey, 5.6% of its population born was born outside South Africa, almost double 
the national average. In 2007, Gauteng Province hosted 46% of South Africa’s population born 
outside South Africa. This is up from 42% in 2001 and is expected to increase in the years ahead. 
This is not surprising when one considers the net migration gain in the province, (i.e., the 
                                                     
8 Figures from the Gauteng Development Agency (http://www.geda.co.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=30). 
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difference between the arrivals and departures from the province): 418,000 between October 
2001 and February 2007. Most of these are domestic migrants, but a significant proportion is 
from outside the country. Even within the Province, non-nationals are concentrated in certain 
cities (7.9% of Johannesburg is foreign born) and particular neighbourhoods. Whereas inner-city 
areas like Yeoville, Berea, and Hillbrow now are close to or above 50% foreign-born, the 
number of non-nationals is negligible elsewhere in the city. 
It is also worth noting that international migrants’ origins differ significantly among 
Provinces and cities. While Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces primarily host Mozambicans 
and Zimbabweans, there is a far greater diversity of foreigners living in Durban and Cape Town 
including many more Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Congolese and Angolans. Somalians are 
also present in all major cities and smaller towns, but in much smaller numbers. As each of these 
groups is likely to have come to South Africa for different reasons, the social protection and 
developmental impacts also significantly differ. 
 Even if international migration attracts the most political attention and popular 
opprobrium, domestic mobility is far more significant in numeric terms. Fully explaining the 
dynamics of inter-community and inter-provincial migration would require another report far 
longer than this. Suffice it to raise a number of critical points. First, research by the South 
African Cities Network (2006:16) and others clearly illustrates the spatial dynamics of migration 
to particular urban centres. In Metsweding, a smaller municipality in Gauteng Province, more 
than 10% of the total population has recently moved there. In Durban, the figure is less than 1%. 
And while discussions of urbanisation typically focus on primary cities, the fastest growing parts 
of Gauteng are not Johannesburg and Pretoria but rather smaller communities beyond the ‘urban 
edge’ (See Table 5). The most notable and controversial effect of this growth has been the 
expansion of poorly serviced informal settlements (i.e., shantytowns) ringing more established 
and well-serviced formal settlements.  
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Table 5 
Migration Figures for Selected Municipalities 2001-2006 
 
Municipality 
In-Migration as 
Percentage of Total 
Population (2006) 
Metsweding (Gauteng) 10.13 
Overberg (KwaZulu-Natal) 8.18 
Tshwane (Pretoria) 7.15 
West Coast (Western Cape) 6.71 
Ekurhuleni (Johannesburg Suburb) 5.88 
West Rand (Johannesburg Suburb) 5.82 
Johannesburg (Gauteng) 4.38 
Cape Town (Western Cape) 4.38 
eThekwini (KwaZulu-Natal) 0.92 
Nelson Mandela (Eastern Cape) 0.63 
 
Source: Data produced by Statistics South Africa. Table 
reproduced from South African Cities Network 2006 p. 2.189 
 
As a result of these internal movements, out migration is also significantly shifting 
population profiles of a number of the country’s smaller and less prosperous communities. For 
example, Chris Hani municipality in the Eastern Cape has lost more than 8.5% of its population 
over the past decade (Cities Network 2006:18). Many of those who left are young men heading 
for the Western Cape (Dorrington 2005). Consequently, there are significant distortions in 
population pyramids in both sending and receiving communities (see Collinson, et al, 2006).  
In addition to sheer numbers—far outweighing the number of international migrants—
shifts within and among Provinces are resulting in significant changes in skills level and social 
composition. In the Western Cape, the arrival of people from the Eastern Cape, traditionally an 
ANC stronghold, is not only transforming the Province’s racial composition, but also threatens 
the viability of the Province’s powerful opposition parties. In Gauteng, the enormous diversity 
                                                     
9 The municipalities represented in these tables were selected by the South African Cities Network, the organisation 
that originally published these data, to illustrate national trends. They are not necessarily representative of all South 
African cities.  
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fostered by migration has proven to be a politically exploitable resource in the past, particularly 
during the violence preceding the 1994 general elections. As South African politics again 
become more competitive, there are hints that ethnicity may re-emerge as a dangerous political 
divide. 
South Africa is also seeing a great diversification in its population’s migration 
trajectories. Whereas Apartheid-era South African migration policy promoted permanent White 
immigration and temporary Black migration, the post-apartheid period is characterised by a mix 
of circular, permanent, and transit migration. Indeed, such impermanence is encouraged by the 
current policy frameworks, the difficulties migrants have in accessing secure accommodation, 
and the rapid rate of deportations (see above).  
As with many of the characteristics of migration, these trends are most visible in Gauteng 
Province. For reasons of location, infrastructure, intention and experience, the Province is as 
much a place of transit as destination. This transit takes multiple forms. The first is the 
continuation of long-standing patterns of circular migration from rural South Africa and 
elsewhere in the region, albeit now focused more around townships and urban centres. The 
second form of transit rests with traders and refugees who come to Gauteng seeking 
opportunities for profit or temporary protection. While often remaining for extended periods in 
the Province, their lives and interactions are typically conditioned by their interest in onward 
movement. The third type of transit migration is driven by those who see Gauteng as a stepping-
stone or trampoline. The Province’s wealth often attracts those who expect to accumulate the 
money needed for onward journeys. Many come hoping for contacts and social networks that 
will facilitate movement to other cities or countries. Still others hope to capitalise on the 
country’s corrupt immigration regime that allows almost anyone with money to secure South 
African citizenship and documentation. With these documents in hand, travel to Europe and 
elsewhere becomes far easier.  
The trend above is illustrated by FMSP research: in the 2006 Wits University survey in 
Johannesburg, 59% of migrants considered Johannesburg as their final destination. This 
proportion is higher for Mozambicans (78%) and for the internal migrants (84%). In many 
regards, the migrants born in Mozambique have the same migratory behaviour as the internal 
migrants in South Africa. When the Mozambicans had considered other destinations, it was 
essentially Swaziland or a European country. South Africans who migrated to Johannesburg also 
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considered other destinations in South Africa. People born in the DRC or in Somalia often 
considered South Africa a second choice and had considered moving to North America or 
Europe before coming. Interestingly, migrants born in the DRC tend to see Johannesburg as a 
point of transit more often than the other groups. Of those surveyed, 30% expected to live in a 
third country in two years time. By comparison, 11% of the migrants born in Somalia expected 
to be elsewhere. Again comparing those two groups, 32% of migrants from DRC and 22% of the 
migrants from Somalia consider that their children should grow up in a third country. Table 6 
captures these figures. 
 
Table 6 
Expectations of the Migrants after Migrating to Inner City Johannesburg 
Where respondent 
expects to live in two 
years 
Place of birth (%) 
DRC Somalia Mozambique 
South Africa outside 
Johannesburg 
South Africa 44 68 60
81
Country of origin 13 8 20
Third country 30 11 4 5
Don’t know 13 12 15 13
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Wits University, African Cities Survey 2006 
 
Linked to these trajectories and other factors, people regularly move within South Africa as well 
as into and out of it. According to the 2007 Community Survey, 18% of Gauteng’s inhabitants 
had moved within the Province since 2001. According to FMSP data for the inner city of 
Johannesburg, the South African born population has, on average, moved twice since coming to 
the city, usually within the last decade. For foreigners, typically in the city for a shorter period, 
the average is slightly above three times.  
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Who Are They and What Do They Do? 
 
Post-apartheid international migration movements towards South Africa have been characterised 
by three major demographic features that distinguish them from the situation in the late 1980s: 
the diversification of migrants’ origins, younger migrants and feminisation. The great post-
apartheid change is the massive influx of both permanent and temporary African and Asian 
migrants. Among these are significant numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. Although 
European permanent immigrants continued to dominate in absolute terms until 1998, since 2000, 
most migrants have come from Africa and Asian.  
Qualitative studies confirm this tendency. Robert Mattes, et al. have demonstrated in a 
1999 study that the profile of qualified migrants and immigrants is revealing of a divide between 
those who settled in South Africa before 1991 and those who arrived since. This study indicates 
that out of a sample of 400 people interviewed, 73% of qualified European migrants arrived 
before 1991 whereas 87% of qualified African migrants outside SADC countries had arrived 
after that, with SADC migrants equally distributed in the two groups. The study confirms this 
dichotomy in status and skills between migrants arrived before and after 1991. Thus, three 
quarters of the qualified migrants who entered South Africa before 1991 were permanent 
residents whereas a very large proportion of those arrived after 1991, essentially Africans, only 
held temporary permits (Mattes, et al, 2000). Tables 7-10 provide additional detail on the 
educational levels and professions of the country’s migrants and their employment status.  
 
20 
 
Table 7 
Levels of Education by South African or Foreign Citizenship (2001) 
 
  Percent 
Nationals 
Percent Non-
Nationals 
No schooling 15.9 16.0
Some primary 30.0 18.9
Complete primary 7.0 7.0
Some secondary 28.0 26.1
Grade 10/ Std 10 13.9 16.9
Tertiary 5.3 15.2
Total  100 100
Source: Stats SA, Population Census, 2001 
 
 
Table 8 
Professions of 16-65 Year Olds by Citizenship (2001) 
 
 Percent 
Nationals 
Percent 
Non-
Nationals 
Legislators; senior officials and managers 5.3 6.3 
Professionals 6.9 8.7 
Technicians and associate professionals 9.6 5.0 
Clerks 11.1 4.6 
Service workers; shop & market sales 
workers 
10.2 9.1 
Skilled agricultural & fishery workers 2.8 3.5 
Craft and related trades workers 11.8 20.8 
Plant and machine operators & assemblers 8.7 10.7 
Elementary occupations 33.6 31.4 
Total 100 100 
Source: Stats SA, Population Census, 2001 
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Table 9 
Employment Status of 16-65 Year Olds by Citizenship (2001) 
 
 Percent 
Nationals 
Percent 
Non-
Nationals 
Employed 33.4 60.1
Unemployed 24.1 14.9
Not economically 
active 
42.5 25.0
Source: Stats SA, Population Census, 2001 
 
 
Table 10 
Work Status of 16-65 Year Olds by Citizenship (2001) 
 
 Percent 
Nationals  
Percent 
Non-
nationals  
Paid employee 89.1 82.0
Paid family worker 1.4 1.1
Self-employed 7.6 14.8
Employer 1.5 1.7
Unpaid family 
worker 
0.5 0.4
Total 100 100
Source: Stats SA, Population Census, 2001 
 
Apart from broadly outlining the economic behaviour of South Africa’s international migrants, 
there are few existing data on their remittance or investment patterns. To some extent this 
reflects broader limits on knowledge about the poor, marginalised, and others who depend 
heavily on the informal sector/second economy for income. Piecing together data collected from 
a variety of sources, Table 11 nevertheless demonstrates that South Africa is at the centre of a 
Southern African remittance network. The Southern African Migration Project goes so far as to 
argue that for most migrant-sending households, migrant remittances form the main source of 
household income, although male migrants’ remittances are more likely to be the primary or sole 
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source of income for their households. It is also worth noting that the women remit significantly 
lower amounts of money than male migrants (Dodson, et al, 2008).  
 
Table 11 
Estimated Intra-Regional Remittance Flows (ZAR) 
 
Receiving Country (ZAR Million) 
Sending 
country 
Botswan
a Lesotho 
Malaw
i Moz. RSA 
Swazilan
d 
Other 
SADC Total 
Botswana __ 2.59 3.65 29.6
4
0.55 51.42 87.87
Lesotho 0.61 __      0.61
Malawi 0.18  __     0.18
Mozambiqu
e 
   __    
RSA 133.28 1,675.8
4 
57.19 2,241.7
1
__ 432.29 1,531.8
5 
6,072.1
5
Swaziland 0.39   __  0.39
Total 134.46 1,678.4
3 
60.84 2,241.7
1
29.6
4
432.84 1,583.2
7 
Source: Genesis Calculations from Various Sources. Table Reproduced from Pendelton, et al, 
2006.  
 
Although SAMP research confirms the importance of remittances, FMSP research provides 
additional dimensions to migrants’ remitting behaviour. While remittances remain important, the 
2006 survey in central Johannesburg found that just over 45% of international migrants sent 
money or goods to people outside the city. This compares broadly with the percentage of South 
Africans who also report regularly sending resources to friends and family elsewhere. However, 
this figure ranged widely among national groups. Among the Congolese, only 33% reported 
sending money, usually to parents (63% of those who send) or other close relatives (38%).The 
percentage rises to 56% among Somalis who send primarily to parents (89%) and siblings (24%). 
In almost all cases, the Somalis relied on community-based remittances systems; those from the 
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DRC depended most frequently on MoneyGram, while Mozambicans typically rely on friends of 
family members to transport remittances. There seems to be little evidence to suggest that legal 
status or income is closely connected to remittance rates. Given the short term many migrants 
remain in Johannesburg, the FMSP data are also inconclusive on whether time in the country is 
connected to increased or decreased remittances. However, the study did find that over a third of 
Congolese in the FMSP sample and almost a fifth of Somalis and South Africans report regularly 
receiving money from outside of the city. In the case of the Congolese, most of these transfers 
originated outside of Africa, suggesting a complex web of multi-sited families and livelihood 
strategies. Qualitative research suggests that these transnational or translocal transfers are often 
related to establishing or support migrants in the city in order to invest, get education, or take 
care of the financial and administrative needs in order to move elsewhere.  
 
In addition to adult migration, FMSP research finds that children as young as seven are 
migrating alone form neighbouring countries due to the death of their parents, lack of money, or 
not being in school. There are no reliable estimates on the total numbers although an FMSP 
study planned for 2009 may provide some estimates. Even without a global figure, it is clear that 
the number of children migrating alone is significant and is almost certainly growing. Once in 
the country, children face exploitation by police who illegally send them back over the border 
and detain them in illegal conditions—such as with adults and for extended periods. Although 
many children in border towns may have legitimate asylum claims, they lack the resources 
needed to reach the urban centres where they could apply for asylum. Children as young as seven 
years old work in exploitative conditions. In a 2007 study by Save The Children near the 
Zimbabwean border, almost a quarter of those interviewed had no income, while a similar 
number made money by collecting items for recycling. Farm work (for boys) and domestic work 
(for girls) were common forms of work. Children who are living in urban centres, however, are 
more likely than those on the borders to be in school and have access to accommodation and 
limited NGO support that prevents them entering this kind of work. Although there has been a 
response from some non-governmental organisations, there has been little effort on the part of 
the Department of Social Development or other government agencies to address the concerns of 
unaccompanied minors.  
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Migration and Skills  
 
A discussion of immigration and development in South Africa would be incomplete without 
some mention of ‘brain drain’ and efforts to recruit the skills needed to grow the South African 
economy. In this regard, South Africa’s distinction lies in its specific position in African 
migratory systems. Unlike countries in the Maghreb or West Africa, South Africa is neither a 
major source nor transit country for low-skilled labour en route to the European Union or North 
America. However, it has increasingly become a source country for highly skilled professionals, 
most notably in the medical professions, mine and mechanical engineering, and information and 
communication technology. The initial flight of skilled professionals began in the 1980s, often 
for a mix of economic and political reasons. Today out-migration continues for an array of 
reasons including job opportunities, wage differentials, working conditions, crime, and as a side-
effect of affirmative action policies that are perceived as limiting career prospects for the 
country’s White minority.  
The main difficulty of estimating the skills loss is linked to poor measures of the volume 
and nature of departures. Recent studies have shown an important gap between recorded 
departures and legal settlements of South Africans in the five first countries of immigration. 
Some have argued that figures provided by Statistics South Africa (relying on Home Affairs 
data) of people recorded as having left the country since 1994, represent less than half the 
number of South African immigrants legally recorded in host countries (mainly the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States). The immigration policies of countries 
such as the UK or Canada have attracted many qualified South Africans, particularly those 
skilled in the medical professions. In 2003-2004, South Africa acknowledged a deficit of 57,574 
nurses, 200 of them leaving the country every month. Since 2004, no figures are available for 
South African citizens’ whereabouts. However, comparing stocks of South African migrants in 
receiving countries and self-declared emigrants, Statistics South Africa came to the conclusion 
that approximately 322,499 South Africans had emigrated between 1970 and 2001 (StatsSA, 
2003; See also Southern African Migration Project Policy Brief 8). In addition to brain drain, 
South Africa suffers from an acute lack of skills due to a history of poor education under 
apartheid.  
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In 2006, the Mbeki government ended its long denial of the widespread loss of skills by 
publicly acknowledging the effects of brain drain and poor education on the South African 
economy. Foreseeing a 1.2 million person skills-gap by 2014, his administration gave birth to the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) and, subsequently, to the 
Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA). The latter initiative identified five areas 
where skills were in particularly short supply: engineering; city, urban, and regional planning; 
artisan and technical skills; management and planning skills in education and health; and math, 
science, and language teachers. A more recent survey by the Harvard Centre for International 
Development (Levinsohn 2008), advocates a proactive high-skill immigration policy as a remedy 
to high unemployment rate. Although one can question the empirics behind the assertion, the 
Harvard study suggests that South African economic growth is capped at far below the desired 
target by the lack of skills. 
Recognising the need to attract skills back to South Africa, First National Bank has 
sponsored an initiative they call the ‘Homecoming Revolution’, an effort premised on South 
African patriotism. Although undoubtedly appealing to some, neither the Homecoming 
Revolution nor JIPSA have made much progress in addressing South Africa’s skills gap. JIPSA 
reports from 2007, for example, suggests that there will continue to be severe skills shortfalls in 
all five of the high profile areas identified when JIPSA was founded in 2006. JIPSA’s 2007 
report predicted that by 2012, the country would be short of approximately 30,000 or more 
artisans, 22,000 engineers, and significant (but unspecified) numbers of town and regional 
planners (JIPSA Task team 2007).  
To further address these gaps, the Department of Home Affairs has identified a number 
of ‘Scarce and Critical’ skills that, if possessed, should enable people to immigrate easily to 
South Africa (see Table 12). However, businesses regularly complain that inefficiencies within 
the Department of Home Affairs and the inflexibility and under capacity of a number of South 
African accreditation bodies (notably the South African Qualifications Authority) have limited 
the number of people they have been able to recruit. That employing non-nationals—even 
African non-nationals—does not help companies achieve Government-set Black Economic 
Empowerment targets further discourages the use of these options. Nonetheless, South Africa is 
today in a rather schizophrenic position in which it is one of the strongest voices against the 
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plundering of highly sought after skilled by developed countries while it stands accused of the 
very same sins by other African countries. 
 
Table 12 
List of ‘Scarce and Critical’ Skills Published by the  
Department of Home Affairs and Number of Individuals Required in Each Occupation 
(2006) 
 
Science and Engineering. Professionals and Associate Professionals 
Aeronautical Engineers: 500
Aircraft maintenance Engineers: 500
Autotronics: Vehicle diagnostic technicians 500
Avionic Engineers  250
Chemical Engineers including Rubber & Plastic  100
Construction/ Civil Engineers  5,000
Design and Engineering: Piping and pipe laying  500
Electronic Radio Frequency and Signal Engineers Microwave and Satellite 
engineers 
500
Geologists  100
Astronomers  200
Astrophysicists  200
Atmospheric physicist  200
Surface physicist  200
Space Scientist  200
Geophysicists  150
Industrial Engineers  5,000
Jewellery Designers  250
Mechanical Engineers including pressure vessel and stress analysis  1,000
Metallurgical Engineers including material processes and development; 
Metallurgists  
250
Mining: Rock and Colliery Engineers  100
Aircraft maintenance technicians  1,000
Architectural Technicians  1,000
Aviations technicians (Aviation specific design and machining technologies) 1,000
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Dimensional Controllers  100
Earth Sciences Technicians  250
Electrical Mechanical including instrumentation 1,000
Electronic technicians: Silicon and Microchip developers  1,000
Foundry metallurgists  500
Hydraulics and Pneumatics Technicians  1,000
Industrial/ Product development technologists  1,000
NDE Technicians  500
Tool designers including Millwrights, Melters, Coded Welders and Moulders. 3,000
Education Professionals 
Maths and Science Teachers  1,000
Information Technology Professionals 
Software Developers  1,500
Software Engineers  1,500
ICT Security Specialists including Dimensional Controllers  1,000
Health and Medical Sciences Professions 
Biological Science Technician  3,000
Bio-informatics  1,000
Biomedical Engineers  1,000
Combinatorial and Computational Chemistry  150
Research and Development: Pharmacologists  300
Agricultural Sciences 
Agricultural Economist (Econometrics)  500
Agricultural Engineers including Farm Irrigation System Engineers  1,000
Agricultural Extension Officers: Technology focused  1,000
Agricultural Statistics: Biometrician, Crop Modeller  1,000
Agricultural Biotechnologists, Genetic Markers and Promoters  1,000
Virologists  250
Oenologist/ Viticulture  350
Geneticist plant breeders  1,000
Pasture Scientists  500
Plant Pathologists  1,000
Food Safety Quality Assurance Specialists  500
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Veterinarians  500
Management and Commerce Professions 
Actuaries  500
Financial Market Analysts  500
Risk Managers  500
Source: Department of Home Affairs (Government Gazette, 08 February 2006) in Daniels 2007 
 
While South Africa struggles to fill its skills gaps through an approach reminiscent of (largely 
discredited) 1970s era ‘manpower planning,’ it has increasing numbers of semi to highly skilled 
immigrants moving spontaneously to the country from the rest of the continent (in particular 
from Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana). The first 
wave of these came early and was composed of intermediate or highly skilled professionals from 
highly unstable countries (such as Zairian / Congolese doctors or mine engineers, or Rhodesian / 
Zimbabwean teachers) who found employment in the former homelands. In the mid 1990s, the 
globalised African elites (academics, bankers, consultants, journalists, etc) also began applying 
for positions in South African firms or for postings in South Africa from within their 
organisations/firms. Many of these were absorbed but many others experienced severe 
downgrading in their skills when coming to South Africa. SADC prohibitions on recruiting 
medical professionals from within the region have further limited the number of professionals in 
South Africa who are able to work in their desired position. A 2008 effort to regularise 
Zimbabwean teachers may help to address part of the gap in the education sector, but there are 
thousands of other skilled professionals who have arrived in the country who are unable to work 
or are underemployed due to lack of documents or certification. 
 
National Policy Frameworks 
 
Beginning in 1990, South Africa has gone through a period of unprecedented political changes. 
Foremost among these are constitutional reforms and an opening of space for political debate. 
This has helped generate a paradox regarding the position of migrants in South African society: 
despite a legal framework guaranteeing international migrants more rights than ever before, 
29 
 
migrants remain remarkably vulnerable to socio-economic exclusion, harassment from police, 
and violence at the hands of state agents and citizens. In official and public deliberation, 
migration often seems caught between complaints about the state’s inability to control the border 
and protect South African job and its incapacity to attract and retain foreign skilled labour and 
investors.  
These tensions in migration policy are rooted in the striking historical absence of 
immigration on the ruling African National Congress’ policy platform. Whether it was the 
party’s initial social-democratic framework with the Redistribution and Development 
Programme (RDP) or the pro-market Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan in 1996, 
politicians have rarely seen migration as a political or economic tool or linked it to the country’s 
socio-economic transformation. Instead, migration policy is the product of a triple process: the 
legacy of apartheid administrations, the constraints created by transition rules (the famous Sunset 
Clauses) and the introduction into the game of new actors and groups carrying with them new 
and often competing models of migration management. Only with the creation of JIPSA 
(described above) has the government explicitly begun linking migration to broader development 
concerns. However, this has taken place without a full review of the country’s migration policies 
that are only likely to be reconsidered by a new post-election government in 2009 or 2010. 
The immigration policy inherited by the de Klerk administration in 1989 bore three 
characteristics. It was initially based on a classical colonial settlement policy focusing on the 
almost exclusive development of the needs of the European minority and its corollary, a cheap 
African labour maintained in a precarious position. Secondly, the management of migration and 
foreigners was discretionary by nature and often based on opaque practices. Finally, the 
development mode through which this policy was meant to evolve was incremental, very rarely 
providing enough space for assessment or even public debate. It was thus largely disconnected 
from ongoing migration trends and dynamics as well as from actual assessments of skills’ needs 
in the various sectors of the South African economy. 
The 1991 Aliens Control Act, nicknamed ‘Apartheid’s last act’, became the cornerstone 
of South African immigration policy throughout the 1990s. Drafted in order to unify and 
simplify all previous immigration laws since 1937, the Act generated fundamental tensions from 
the advent of the 1994 democratic regime. In contradiction with the 1993 Interim Constitution 
and the 1996 Constitution, the 1991 Aliens Control Act was ultimately declared unconstitutional. 
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Following this decision, the ANC decided to substantially reform its immigration legislation. To 
this end, the party began an official consultation process in 1996. This ultimately resulted in a 
new Immigration Act in 2002 and the Immigration Amendment Act in 2004.  
The new immigration legislation—still in place today—reflects the policy priorities that 
informed its writing. To some extent, the act continues to favour highly skilled labour and 
investors, providing a number of ways for such people to enter and stay within the country, 
although even these often have to put up with gross bureaucratic incompetence. For everyone 
else, the act retains a strong security and sovereignty-centred agenda reflecting a narrowly 
defined notion of national interest that bears strong resemblance to positions held by the previous 
regime.  
This policy itself is the source of tension. Like many social-democratic governments, the 
ANC and its migration policy are caught between the acceptance of market rules that include the 
free circulation of labour and the consequences of South Africa’s limited weight in the global 
economy. Yet, as opposed to Western social-democratic regimes, South Africa, as an African 
state, faces up to a more complex situation in which elites often seem very remote from 
perceptions of migration on the ground, especially in an urban environment as rapidly changing 
as post-apartheid South African cities. Whatever the reason, the 2002 Immigration Act (as 
amended in 2004) enjoys very little support from all sides, government, business and civil 
society. The current (likely to be outgoing) Minister, Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula, appointed in 
2004 and reappointed in October 2008, promised a policy review process that is only 
materialising as she completes her term.  
While the act remains both unpopular and unchanged, there have been some significant 
shifts in South Africa’s migration regime. First, after a decade opposing the Southern African 
Development Community Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, South Africa 
was among the first member states to sign the amended protocol in 2005. Even if the 2005 
SADC Protocol was largely devoid of its substance compared to the original proposal made by 
the SADC Secretariat in 1995, this shows a will to open up to a regional approach. This has also 
materialised in new agreements with Mozambique (2004) and Lesotho (2007), aiming at 
progressively lifting border control with these immediate neighbours. While hinting at 
regionalism, policy changes continue to be dominated by South Africa’s short-term national 
interests and regionalism moves forward at South Africa's discretion.  
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A second interesting move incorporates the language of the migration and development 
nexus. This was most visible in Home Affairs Minister Mapisa-Nqakula’s appearance at the UN 
High Level Dialogue in September 2006 where she spoke boldly on the issue on behalf of the 
G77 plus China (Crush 2008). South Africa has also endorsed both the African Union (AU) 
Strategic Framework on Migration and the AU Common Position on Migration and 
Development. More recently (September 2008), South Africa hosted a delegation of the 
European Union for the first EU-South Africa Dialogue that was part of the EU-South Africa 
bilateral agreement. New encounters between the EU and South Africa on the issue of migration 
are planned in 2009 but without any official intention to include SADC so far, a position that 
contradicts the regional stance that Mapisa-Nqakula has otherwise tended to promote. On 
migration as on other issues such as trade, the EU interventionism, if not channelled to better fit 
the regional agenda, might on the contrary exacerbate already existing gaps in policy views 
between the richest member states, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, and the others. 
The tragic May 2008 events may awaken political leaders who seem to be largely in 
denial. Far from being an isolated bout of criminal violence, as then President Thabo Mbeki 
stated, the attacks reflected deeply entrenched xenophobic attitudes and behaviours regularly 
documented since the mid-1990s (see, for example, Southern African Migration Project 1998 & 
2006). The absence of a strong response to address the root causes or any immediate official 
investigation suggests an unwillingness to address violent, anti-foreigner sentiments. Even the 
South African Human Rights Commission, a body Constitutionally empowered to protect the 
rights of all of South Africa’s residents, had to be publicly cajoled into holding hearings. These 
are now tentatively scheduled for almost a year after the attacks.  
Although the ruling party has yet to address the deeply troubling social and political 
consequences of migration, there is a slow recognition that immigration and emigration are 
critical to the country’s developmental trajectory. However, the stumbling blocks remain 
numerous and characterised by high levels of intolerance among the most deprived 
constituencies of the South African population, poor interdepartmental coordination, the absence 
of data production mechanisms on migration flows and their impact and the lack of capacity and 
corruption among Home Affairs staff in particular (see Chesang 2005). 
 There are also uncomfortable, if predictable, intersections between the country’s 
immigration and asylum policy. In many instances, their inadequacies interact in ways that 
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produce vicious synergies, exaggerating the shortcomings of both policy areas. The asylum 
policy, outlined in the Refugees Act (1998) and subsequent regulations, is South Africa’s first 
domestic refugee legislation. Incorporating both the UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
OAU (now AU) Refugee Protocol, the policy offers every individual the right to apply for 
asylum at any of the country’s five refugee reception offices (RROs). On application, asylum 
seekers are to be issued with a ‘Section 22’ permit that, in almost all instances, gives the 
applicant the right to work and study but does not provide access to anything other than 
emergency social services. According to the law, asylum seekers are to receive a decision within 
six months. At this time, they are provided refugee status (usually for a period of two years) or 
asked to leave the country or apply for another immigration status. Throughout, asylum seekers 
and refugees are provided freedom of movement within the country. 
 Due to job seekers lack of options for obtaining immigration documents, many use the 
asylum system as a ‘backdoor’ to South Africa. The prevalence of Malawians, Tanzanians, and 
citizens from other peaceful countries attests to this tendency. Due to a combination of these 
applications and poor management by the Department of Home Affairs (which is responsible for 
Refugee Status Determination), the backlog of asylum claims is now over 100,000 (refer to 
Table 1 for additional statistics on asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa). Few people 
receive decisions within the expected six months and many wait years before being summarily 
rejected (many then appeal, creating yet another backlog). This has the dual effect of denying 
protection to many of those who need it while attracting yet more job seekers who benefit from 
the interim status. The lasting consequence is that the asylum system has been delegitimised, 
with few institutions, social services and employers recognising refugee or asylum papers. (For 
more, see Handmaker, et al, 2008 and CORMSA 2008). The lack of an effective response to tens 
of thousands of Zimbabweans fleeing that country’s crisis has also fed into popular perceptions 
that the country is being overrun and that citizens will be burdened with supporting their needy 
neighbours.  
 There are no easy answers to either the ever growing backlog or current patterns of 
Zimbabwean migration. On two attempts, the Department of Home Affairs, with support from 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and others, have attempted to address the 
backlog. However, they evidently lacked the skills, information, will, and resources to do so. 
Other improvements include the creation of an information unit within the DHA that can provide 
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support to status determination officers. However, basic administrative procedures and 
supervision—to say nothing of poorly equipped offices, corruption, and poor information 
management—continue to work against reform. Recommendations by a DHA hired private 
consulting company, Fever Tree, may help to address these challenges. However, doing so will 
require significant changes to human resource management within the status determination 
process. While these may result in critical improvements, the fastest way of reducing the backlog 
would be to open other avenues for migration into South Africa. Without such opportunities, 
asylum will continue to be an attractive option for migrants attempting to regularise their stay in 
South Africa. 
 Addressing concerns over Zimbabwean migration means first overcoming the denialism 
that has surrounded South Africa’s response to Zimbabwe. For the better part of this decade, 
South Africa has proclaimed its solidarity with Zimbabwe’s leadership by refusing to admit there 
is a crisis despite skyrocketing inflation, political violence, and public health emergencies. 
Accordingly, South African government leaders have categorically labelled Zimbabweans as 
economic migrants. While many Zimbabweans have long sought work in the country, such a 
position denies the political sources of economic deprivation and the well-documented incidents 
of torture and persecution in Zimbabwe. Until 2007, there were regular reports that Refugee 
Reception Offices were refusing all asylum applicants from Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabweans 
are now able to apply for asylum, few have been granted legal protection. Apart from granting 
asylum or some sort of temporary protection to all Zimbabweans in South Africa, South Africa 
has a number of policy options. The first is to relax entry requirements for Zimbabweans in line 
with existing bi-lateral and SADC agreements. There are also options for exploiting other status 
options within the 2002 Immigration Act. Whatever option is selected, it should allow repeated 
entry into South Africa and the option to trade or work (in order to support families in 
Zimbabwe), provide legal status while in South Africa, and provide needs-based access to 
humanitarian assistance.10 
 
Migration and Local Governance  
 
Population movements–some predictable, some spontaneous; some voluntary, some forced–are 
                                                     
10 For more on responding to Zimbabweans in South Africa, see Polzer 2007. 
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now perennial features of South African Cities (South African Cities Network 2004:36; Balbo 
and Marconi 2005; Bekker 2002; Dorrington 2005). As elsewhere in the world, urban centres are 
increasingly central nodes in international and domestic migration. Constitutionally empowered 
to be a leading force for development, local governments have nevertheless been wary of 
addressing migration concerns. This partially stems from a belief among many policy makers 
(local and national), that immigration is exclusively a matter of national policy concern. Some 
have yet to realise the degree to which migration is transforming their cities. Others naively hope 
that heightened human mobility is simply a temporary outgrowth of the country’s democratic 
transition. In almost all instances, budgeting and planning exercises have largely excluded 
extended population projections. Consequently, city leaders continue to plan for a slowly 
growing and largely stable population.  
 This section explores local government’s role in responding to migration; some of the 
challenges associated with developing such a response; and the political hazards associated with 
current approaches. The discussion includes national trends with particular attention to the 
country’s two primary cities: Cape Town and Johannesburg. Doing so highlights similarities and 
critical differences in the political calculus of migration management. We also pay considerable 
attention to non and semi-official responses to migration in the form of violence, discrimination, 
and economic exclusion. Whereas South Africa has taken conscious steps to institutionalise a 
human rights culture and the rule of law, these sharply contrast with these social and semi-
official responses. These include the privatisation of violence and the spreading economies of 
corruption that are such unfortunate characteristics of countries across the continent.  
 
Local Government Responsibilities and Responses11 
 
 Some within local government have seen increasing migration and diversity as a hugely 
positive sign of South African cities’ emergence as trading and cultural centres. In response, city 
planners in both Johannesburg and Cape Town have begun outlining strategies for recruiting and 
incorporating highly skilled migrants and refugees into the city’s socio-economic networks.12 
However, it is also evident that many of the cities’ leaders and citizens feel overwhelmed – if not 
                                                     
11 The introductory paragraphs of this section draw heavily from Götz and Landau 2004 and Götz 2004.  
12 In 2005, Cape Town conducted a skills audit of its refugee population so as to better develop policies to capitalise 
on their presence in the city. Johannesburg has yet to follow suit but has recently officially recognised the potential 
contributions migrants make to the city.  
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threatened – by migration, and especially, the movement of people south from the rest of the 
continent. In other places, the out-migration of the cities’ skilled and affluent is raising the 
spectre of economic decline and an ever-expanding underclass (SACN 2006). For many, 
migration is tied to the expansion of drug syndicates, prostitution, and human trafficking, 
unemployment, crime, and a range of other social and economic ills. Apart from a few 
exceptional cases, elected officials sense that urbanisation and international migration raise the 
spectre of economic and political fragmentation and urban degeneration (see Beal, et al, 2003).  
Most of South Africa’s Metros are now accepting that new arrivals are part of their 
populations. Part of the shift in policy comes from the slow recognition among some officials in 
local government that without apartheid-style measures to control movements—measures that 
for reasons of intention and incapacity never achieved 100% effectiveness—cities can do little to 
alter regional migration dynamics (Kok and Collinson 2006; Johannesburg Strategic 
Development Strategy 2006). In the words of one Johannesburg city councillor, ‘as much as we 
might not want them here, we cannot simply wish these people away’ (Personal Communication, 
13 July 2005). FMSP research reveals similar perspectives among planners and planning 
documents in Cape Town and elsewhere.13 
However, this recognition does not come without considerable trepidation and most local 
governments have thus far failed to develop empirically informed and proactive policy responses 
to international migration. Rather than replacing existing divisions with shared rules of economic 
and social engagement, discrimination against non-citizens threatens further fragmentation and 
social marginalization. There is a real possibility that exclusion based on nationality or 
community of origin effects initiatives, ‘to achieve a shared vision, amongst all sectors of our 
society, for the achievement of our goal of improving the quality of life for all citizens’ (Gauteng 
Province 2005:3). Although there are slow changes in government, many officials continue to 
react to the presence of foreign migrants by implicitly denying their presence, excluding them 
from developmental plans, or allowing discrimination throughout the government bureaucracy 
and police. In both Cape Town and Johannesburg, internal and domestic migrants continue to be 
seen largely as a drain on public resources (see Provincial Government of Western Cape 2002) 
rather than as potential resources or, more neutrally, as the people government is dedicated to 
                                                     
13 Johannesburg metropolitan government has slowly begun to consider migrants as a vulnerable group although it is 
unclear whether any efforts to include migrants in local decision-making priorities are being made. 
36 
 
serve. Even those who wish to more proactively absorb new, often poor and vulnerable 
populations, face considerable challenges in determining how to do so.  
 
Challenges of Developing Effective Local Government Responses to Migration 
 
Recognising the imperative to address migration in building inclusive, safe, and prosperous cities 
does not necessarily mean that officials have the information or tools to do this effectively. 
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to local governments charged with creating inclusive 
cities is the elusive meaning of inclusion for South Africa’s highly diverse and fragmented urban 
communities (see Tomlinson, et al, 2003). With the end of apartheid era pass-laws and the 
country’s full reintegration into regional politics and trade, previously ‘forbidden’ cities have 
become the destination—if not the terminus—for peoples from throughout South Africa and the 
African continent. In many instances, these inward movements have been accompanied by the 
flight of affluent residents from the inner cities. As a result, the population of Cape Town, 
Durban, and especially Johannesburg is a new population and in many neighbourhoods, it is 
difficult to speak of an indigenous community or dominant culture or ethos. This is most visible 
in central Johannesburg, an area almost completely comprised of new arrivals (See Table 13).  
 
Table 13 
Time in South Africa or Johannesburg14 
 
 Citizens Non-Citizens 
Less than 1 year 5.2 13.0
1-2 Years 3.6 12.8
2-3 years 8.9 10.6
3-4 years 6.3 10.6
4-5 years 3.6 8.4
5-6 years 5.2 8.1
6-7 years 7.3 5.8
                                                     
14 Citizens were asked how long they had been in Johannesburg. Foreigners were asked how long they had been in 
the Republic of South Africa. As most foreigners come quickly to Johannesburg, this may be a good indication of how 
long they have been in the city.  
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7-8 years 3.6 5.6
8-9 years 2.6 3.1
9-10 years 7.8 4.8
Greater than 10 43.8 13.9
N 192 640
 
For cities that have experienced rapid rates of urbanization, it is almost impossible to speak about 
integration or creating unified urban communities. Multi-culturalism is a fact, but without the 
guarantees that interactions will be peaceful, productive, or characterised by mutual respect. In 
many instances, the opposite has been true (see the discussion of xenophobia and conflict 
below). The atomisation and fragmentation of South African cities stands in sharp contrast with 
the vision of a self-identified urban population invested in cities’ futures.  
 Negotiating a common basis of belonging is made all the more difficult by the nature of the 
cities’ new populations. Many who come to the city do not expect to stay there for long. 
According to Statistics South Africa, ‘the temporary nature of rural-to-urban migration in South 
Africa may add insight into the persistence of overcrowding and poor living conditions in urban 
townships. Migrants may employ a calculated strategy to maximise the benefits to their 
household of origin, rather than for their own benefit or the benefit of residential units in the 
urban setting’ (in Johannesburg Development Strategy 2006: 28). Critically, journeys home or 
onwards often remain practically elusive for reasons of money, safety, or social status. This 
leaves almost two-thirds of Johannesburg’s non-national population effectively marooned in the 
city, but not wishing to take root or invest in it. We also see evidence of this extra-local 
orientation in the levels of remittances being sent out of the city to both rural communities and 
other countries.  
 A further challenge of responding to migration comes from the little local governments 
know about the people living in their cities. Whereas national governments have the relative 
luxury of developing generalised policy frameworks, local governments and service providers 
are responsible for more focused and context specific interventions. For many of the reasons 
discussed above, in almost no instances are city governments able to draw on a nuanced and 
dynamic understanding of their constituencies. This is generally true regarding the urban poor 
and all the more so with geographically mobile people. Efforts to map ‘poverty pockets’ (Cross, 
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et al, 2005) and review both national and localised migration data (Dorrington 2005; Bekker 
2002; Kok and Collinson 2006; SACN 2006; Landau and Gindrey 2008) represent some of the 
first concerted effort to understand South Africa’s urban population dynamics. However, many 
of these studies are based on admittedly incomplete census data—particularly inaccurate 
regarding foreign-born populations—and are often purely descriptive. While the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government now recognises that there is a need for improving cross-border 
and multi-nodal planning—including a greater consideration of population mobility—planners 
are effectively unable to understand the ‘functional economic geography of the city and its 
region [and] how the different components relate to each other’ (SACN 2006: Section 2-7). In 
this context, local planners continue to be influenced by stereotypes and misreading or 
incomplete readings of data.  
 The inability to effectively understand and predict urban populations poses significant risks 
to local governments’ ability to meet their obligations and developmental objectives. Perhaps 
most obviously, the invisibility of large segments of the urban population can result in much 
greater demand for services than predicted, reducing service quality and outstripping budgetary 
allocations. In many instances, these are hidden costs—to public and private infrastructure, 
water, and other services that are not accessed individually. The degradation to building stock 
due to high-population densities—a consequence of new migrants minimizing costs while 
maximizing centrality—also has long-term cost implications for cities that collect taxes on the 
bases of building values. Higher populations do not, however, necessarily result in higher costs 
to local government in receiving areas. Because many of South Africa’s internal migrants are 
young men, they may remain relatively healthy, autonomous, and productive in urban areas – 
and hence levy few costs. Moreover, while they may not invest in property, much of their 
consumption—of food and consumer goods—is in urban areas. In such instance, sending 
communities may lose the benefits of their labour while being saddled with the costs of 
educating their children and providing for them in their old age. Many of these costs are paid 
centrally or via the provinces, but others are the responsibility of local government.  
 While both sending and receiving communities are influenced by the significant costs and 
benefits associated with migration, these calculations have rarely figured into the distribution of 
national resources by the South African Treasury. Since the promulgation of the new constitution 
in 1996, the Treasury has distributed money to the Provinces (and subsequently to the Metros) 
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based almost exclusively on current population estimates. Such practices are problematic for at 
least three reasons. First, the population estimates often significantly misrepresent where people 
actually live. Someone may own a house and vote in a rural community but live elsewhere for 
eleven months of the year (Department of Housing 2006). Secondly, peoples' presence in a 
particular locality is not necessarily a good predictor of their costs to local or provincial 
government. Third, infrastructure and social service planning requires long-term investments 
based on predictions of population in five to fifteen years time. Without reliable estimates, cities 
are unable to prepare for their population’s future needs. In late September 2006, the South 
African Fiscal Commission convened a seminar to try to come to grips with these issues in order 
to better advise the treasury on resource distribution. In 2008, the Treasury again met—with 
World Bank support—to discuss resource allocation. However, planning continues to be based 
on current rather than projected population distributions and all but ignores undocumented 
migrants. Perhaps most worrying is that many planners’ remain unaware of such an approach’s 
frailty in a country with such high rates of mobility. This is likely to become particularly 
problematic as South Africa begins implementing its national spatial development framework.15  
 The lack of coordination among government departments further exaggerates the partial 
and often ill-informed responses to human mobility. In discussions with planners in both 
Johannesburg and Cape Town, they repeatedly expressed frustration regarding their efforts to 
foster collaboration within local government departments and, more importantly, between local 
government and South Africa’s other two governmental ‘spheres’ (Provincial and National). 
However, due to migration’s spatial dynamics, effectively responding to human mobility is not 
something that any single governmental body or sphere can singly address as it requires co-
ordination and planning that transcends the boundaries of metropolitan areas and encompasses a 
wider area connected by commuter flows, economic linkages and shared facilities.  
 The paucity of collaboration is visible in a variety of potentially critical areas. Perhaps 
most obviously, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has been either reluctant or unable to 
share its data with city planners. These not only include the number of foreigners legally entering 
the country, but registered moves, deaths, and births. The most probable cause is lack of capacity 
within the DHA, although there is undoubtedly also a general reluctance to freely share 
information. It is, of course, not only the DHA that has shown a reluctance to work with local 
                                                     
15 For more on the country’s spatial development perspective, visit 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/main.asp?include=docs/pcsa/planning/nsdp/main.html 
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government, but the lack of coordination between DHA and local government is probably the 
most significant gap. 
 
Exclusions and Fragmentation: Responses to Migration 
 
The challenges outlined above, together with widespread xenophobia and ignorance over 
migrants’ rights, are promoting fragmentation and unhealthy competition in the South African 
cities that have become primary migration destinations and points of transit. This is evident in a 
range of areas critical to human development including (but not limited to), access to social 
services, markets, and financial services; and interactions with the police and other regulatory 
bodies. The consequences—discussed in more detail below—include economic losses, threats to 
security and health, low degrees of social capital, and less liveable communities.  
 
Markets and Financial Services 
 
Ready access to informal and formal markets for exchanging goods and services is critical to 
successful urban economies. Unfortunately, non-nationals are often systematically excluded 
from employment and income generating opportunities through both formal and informal 
mechanisms. Many foreign citizens without the right to work—but with the skills and a 
willingness to do so—accept positions where they are paid below the minimum wage or work in 
inhumane conditions. Even those with employment rights report being turned away by 
employers who do not recognise their papers or their professional qualifications. Without money 
to have their qualifications recognised by the South African Qualifications Agency (SAQA), 
they have little choice but to seek other ways to generate income. A recent court decision now 
allows undocumented migrants to seek recourse for labour abuses through the Labour Court and 
other arbitration mechanisms. However, it is unclear whether this will have any substantive 
impact on improving labour conditions.  
Patterns of exclusion are also evident in private sector industries where poor foreigners 
are typically unable to access even the most rudimentary banking services. Although current 
banking legislation technically prevents anyone except permanent residents and citizens from 
opening bank accounts, this policy may be waived on a discretionary level (see Jacobsen & 
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Bailey 2004). Under pressure from lobbying groups, some banks have now begun extending 
services to refugees, but are still unwilling to open accounts for other African immigrants who do 
not have the requisite thirteen-digit identity number or foreign passport. New anti-money 
laundering measures have also made it necessary to have proof of residential address in South 
Africa in order to get or maintain an account, something that de facto, excludes many domestic 
and international migrants. Absurdly high bank charges exclude even more. Elsewhere in the 
world, banks have recognised the profits to be made from providing foreigners access to 
financial services; not only because they typically save at a higher rate than more secure local 
populations, but also because they frequently transfer money to and from other countries. At 
present, only wire-transfer services and informal moneychangers are collecting the considerable 
profits from such transactions.  
 
Social Services 
 
A cocktail of inadequate documentation, ignorance, and outright discrimination, prevents many 
non-nationals who are legally in South Africa from accessing critical social services. Those in 
the country without documents face even greater obstacles. Section 5(1) of the South African 
Schools Act 84 of 1996, for example, declares that, ‘a public school must admit learners and 
serve their educational requirements without unfairly discriminating in any way.’ Moreover, 
Article 27(g) of the Refugees Act (130 of 1998) states that, ‘Refugees as well as refugee children 
are entitled to the same basic health services and basic primary education which the inhabitants 
of the republic receive from time to time’ (cited in Stone and Winterstein 2003). Despite these 
provisions, asylum seekers and refugees—to say nothing of other foreigners—face significant 
obstacles in accessing the educational services to which they are entitled. Recent Wits University 
research found that close to one third of school age non-national children are currently not 
enrolled in schools due to an inability to pay fees, the costs of transport, uniforms and books, or 
explicit exclusion by school administrators. Even those in school report regularly being subjected 
to xenophobic comments by teachers or other students. 
Similar forms of exclusion are reflected in access to health service. Section 27(1) of The 
Constitution states that everyone has the right to health care services, including reproductive 
health care. This clause is followed by Section 27(2) binding the state to make reasonable 
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measures towards realising these rights. Under law, refugees are entitled to have access to the 
same basic health care as South African citizens, although other migrants are required to pay 
additional fees.16 Section 27(3) of the South African Constitution clearly states, however, that no 
one—regardless of nationality, documentation, or residency status—may be refused emergency 
medical treatment.  
The inability or unwillingness of many hospital staff members to distinguish between 
different classes of migrants (coupled with xenophobia) often means that migrants, including 
refugees, are denied access to basic and emergency health services or are charged inappropriate 
fees. Many non-nationals report not being able to access Anti-Retroviral Treatment, for example, 
because they do not have green, bar-coded ID documents. Non-nationals may not only be refused 
services outright, but foreigners report being made to wait longer than South Africans before 
being seen and are subject to other forms of discrimination. While waiting, one refugee 
overheard nurses talking about ‘foreigners taking government money and having too many 
babies,’ and another reports a hospital staff member describing the hospital as ‘infested’ with 
foreigners. There are also accounts indicating that non-nationals are often denied full courses of 
prescribed medicines (see Nkosi 2004; Pursell 2005).  
Failure to overcome these obstacles can have dire consequences. A 2003 national study 
of refugees and asylum seekers found that 17 percent of refugees and asylum seekers had been 
denied emergency medical care, often because of improper documentation or ignorance on the 
part of the admitting nurses (Belvedere 2003). If one could calculate this as a percentage of those 
who had sought such care, the figure would be much higher. In one particularly dramatic 
incident reported in Johannesburg, an expecting Somali woman was refused service on the 
grounds that (a) delivery, unless problematic, did not constitute an emergency and (b) she could 
not pay the additional fee levied on foreigners (which as a refugee she was not required to pay). 
As a result, she ultimately delivered the child on the pavement outside the hospital, only to have 
it die a few weeks later. This is an extreme example, but speaks to broader patterns of exclusion 
from effective protection. Given their tenuous status in the country, often aggravated by a lack of 
proper identification and their relative ignorance of their rights, many foreigners simply accept 
these violations. Indeed, only 1 percent of refugees who were refused health services lodged a 
                                                     
16 Section 27 (g) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (see also s 27 (b)). For more on refugee access to health care, see 
Pursell 2005.  
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complaint and 24 percent report doing nothing, largely because they did not know what to do 
(Belvedere 2003).  
 
Accommodation 
 
Providing access to dignified and healthy housing is a key policy challenge for South Africa in 
relation to all its residents. However, non-citizens are comprehensively excluded from subsidized 
housing programmes for low-income groups, including the National Housing Subsidy Scheme,17 
the National Housing Programme for the Upgrading of Informal Settlements,18 the Emergency 
Housing Programme19 and subsidised rental in Council properties. In all cases, no specific 
mention is made of refugees or asylum seekers, let alone other migrants.  
 Due to these exclusions and a general shortage of public housing, FMSP research in urban 
areas suggests that 70% of urban migrants live in privately rented inner-city flats, of which 36% 
are main tenants and 64% are in sub-tenancy arrangements (Greenburg and Polzer 2008; also 
Peberdy and Majodina 2000).Housing insecurity is most strikingly illustrated by migrants’ 
experience of overcrowding through sub-tenancy. Of survey respondents, 40% stated this as their 
main housing concern. Overcrowding impacts negatively on both physical and mental health, on 
the ability to build a sustainable livelihood, and on child development. Since overcrowding also 
contributes to the degeneration of buildings and urban infrastructure, it is in the interest of 
metropolitan councils to reduce housing insecurity. 
 Research also reveals that rental agencies and landlords are often not aware of the 
differences between legal migrants (such as asylum seekers and refugees) and undocumented 
migrants, believing that it is illegal to engage in a contract with refugees and asylum seekers (see 
quote above);20 Those that do rent to foreigners often take advantage of their status by extracting 
higher rents,21 refusing to maintain property,22 and failing to return security deposits. In FMSP 
research, almost one quarter of foreign residents reported having been evicted.  
 
                                                     
23 Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003. 
23 Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003. 
23 Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003. 
23 Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003. 
23 Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003. 
23 Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003. 
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Investigations, Detention, and Arrests 
 
Throughout the country, police officers are exploiting poor oversight, xenophobic discourses, 
and immigrants’ vulnerabilities to supplement their income and address what many incorrectly 
assume to be the root cause of crime. Non-South Africans living or working in Johannesburg, for 
example, report having been stopped by the police far more frequently than South Africans 
despite having generally lived in the city for shorter periods (See Landau 2005).  
Although legally mandated to respect non-nationals’ rights, police often refuse to 
recognise work permits or refugee identity cards. Some respondents even report having their 
identity papers confiscated or destroyed in order to justify an arrest. Furthermore, there are 
numerous assertions that police elicit bribes from apprehended persons (documented and 
undocumented) in exchange for freedom (see Palmary, et al. 2003:113). In 2005, a national 
investigative television programme broadcast footage of such bribes and an interview with a 
woman who was still bleeding from wounds she received as a result of not paying them.  
Beyond xenophobia, there are structural reasons why the police often target foreigners. 
Denied access to almost all formal banking service, poor immigrants must either stash cash in 
their residences or carry it on their bodies (Jacobsen & Bailey 2004). Combined with their 
tenuous legal status, (often) poor documentation, and tendency to trade on the street (hawking or 
informal business), some police officers have come to see foreigners as ‘mobile-ATMs’ (Private 
Communication: 7 May 2004). In the words of one Eritrean living in South Africa, ‘as foreign 
students we are not required to pay taxes to the government. But when we walk down these 
streets, we pay.’ A study conducted in late 2000 indicates that the frustrations outlined above 
reflect systematic patterns of bias where asylum seekers are arrested and detained for failure to 
carry identity documents; based on a particular physical appearance; for the inability to speak 
any of the main national languages; or simply for fitting an undocumented migrant ‘profile’ 
(Algotsson 2000). Statements by senior police officials admit that this is a common practice, but 
the burden of proof nevertheless remains with non-nationals to establish their legal status in the 
country or buy their way into freedom.  
 It is, of course, not only violence and extortion from the police that worries international 
migrants. As Crush and Williams (2003) argue, many South Africans are ill content to leave the 
regulation of migration and, particularly, immigration in State hands. Soon after South Africa’s 
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first democratic election, Alexandra Township north of the city centre organised a campaign 
entitled ‘Operation Buyelekhaya’ (Operation Go Back Home) in an effort to rid the township of 
all foreigners (Palmary, et al 2003: 112). Nor are these efforts limited to Johannesburg. In 2002, 
Du Noon Township outside Cape Town also passed a resolution expelling all foreigners and 
prohibiting them from returning (Palmary, et al, 112; Southwell 2002). Despite this long history 
of violence against non-nationals by South African citizens, no effective steps have been taken 
by any of the government departments to address these conflicts.  
Such attacks are fuelled by numerous factors including disaffection and anger by South 
Africans at worsening economic conditions and lack of service delivery; perceived competition 
with non-nationals for jobs and scarce business opportunities; as well as incitement by organised 
criminal elements. The failure to regularise the large number of foreign nationals in South Africa 
and the absence of a humanitarian programme for Zimbabweans has also heightened anti-
foreigner sentiments and tensions. The heavy handed way in which police have conducted 
immigration raids has also led to a perception by perpetrators of violence that they are assisting 
in removing ‘illegals’ from the country. Indeed, previous responses to xenophobic violence 
include arresting and deporting the undocumented non-national victims of violence who had 
sought refuge at police stations. This amounted to a tacit condoning of the violence in that 
government action was assisting residents to remove forcibly non-nationals from particular areas. 
With national elections coming on the horizon, there are good reasons to believe that South 
Africa will see a resurgence of anti-foreigner violence.  
 
Consequences for Urban Governance and Development 
  
If not addressed, the challenges outlined above will have significant impacts on South Africa’s 
ability to improve the welfare of foreigners and citizens. As noted earlier, South Africa has a 
substantial skills gap that the government hopes to fill by spending millions of Rand on skills 
training (Department of Labour 2005; See also Ellis 2008). However, few employers (including 
the government) capitalise on the economic potential of those already in their cities or who are 
likely to come in the near future including international migrants. While South Africa faces an 
acute nursing shortage, for example, there are certified refugee nurses in South Africa who can 
not find work. Instead of positively exploiting the presence of foreigners who are often well 
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educated and experienced, current policy criminalises migrants and drives processes of 
informalisation and illegality. In efforts to protect the rights and livelihoods of citizens, 
immigration policy has de facto promoted the illegal hiring of non-nationals in ways that 
continue to undermine the unions and suppress the wages paid to all workers. Moreover, by 
encouraging non-nationals (and those who hire them) to work in the informal sector or shadow 
economy, the government deprives itself of an important source of revenue and helps create 
networks of corruption and illegality that will be difficult to eradicate.  
Migrants’ inability to access secure banking also has manifold consequences that extend 
beyond those excluded from service. Perhaps most obviously, inaccess to financial services 
(particularly credit) discourages migrants from investing in the cities in which they live (see 
Leggett 2003; Jacobsen & Bailey 2004; Simone 2004: 10). (Although those included in our 
Johannesburg survey are still more likely to hire people to work for them—often South 
Africans—than South African entrepreneurs are (See also Hunter and Skinner 2003) Such 
obstacles can only aggravate infrastructural decay, limit job creation, and prevent a kind of 
‘rooting’ through investment that can help stabilise communities and promote long-term 
planning. Given the migrants’ general entrepreneurialism, their exclusion from business will 
have disproportionate effects. Keeping migrants and those they hire from moving into the 
informal economy also denies the government a source of direct revenues (from taxes and 
licensing fees) and means that much of the business that takes place is, to a greater or lesser 
degree, illegal. This, in turn, weakens the law’s (and the state’s) legitimacy and regulatory 
power.  
Education and health care are central to any population’s economic and physical health 
(See Annan 1999:4). In transforming urban settings, education serves a dual role. The first is to 
provide children and youth with the technical and analytical training they need to compete and 
contribute to a specialised, skills-based economy. Obstacles to any group acquiring those skills 
will, consequently, project existing inequalities into future generations and limit the country’s 
ability to adapt to new economic opportunities. Education serves a second, but no less critical 
role: forging communities from strangers. Through the sustained interactions within the 
classroom, diverse groups learn common sets of rules, how to exercise civil rights, and mutual 
respect. Exclusion from education, therefore, can create a subset of the population without the 
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knowledge or skills to interact productively within the city. Given the extraordinary degree to 
which South African cities are fragmented and transient, this role is especially critical. 
While the inability to access education may have delayed effects, denying migrants 
access to health services has both immediate and long-term consequences. In the short term, it 
puts them at physical risk and endangers the welfare of those who depend on them. Denying 
basic health services also raises the spectre of public health crises as recent cholera outbreaks in 
Musina and elsewhere in South Africa illustrate (IRIN 2008a). While medical staff may 
discriminate between citizens and non-nationals, infectious agents are far less discerning. As 
long as migrants and South Africans continue to share space—often living in close proximity—
those unable to access treatment become a danger to all those around them. A work force already 
weakened by the scourge of HIV/AIDS, is in no position to accept such an additional threat.  
Informal responses and arbitrary policing are also developing their own dynamics and 
momentum that limit leaders’ ability to retain the power of law. Citizens and non-nationals alike 
now face threats to the legal protections the law ostensibly guarantees. However, if the police 
can not be trusted, they have little choice but to develop alternative mechanisms to ensure their 
safety. Although many South Africans support the police’s strategy of targeting foreigners on 
assumptions that they are behind most of the country’s criminal activity, such actions are largely 
ineffective in establishing order or security. For one, there is no evidence showing foreigners are 
disproportionately prone to criminal activity (Harris 2001). An obsession with them 
consequently distracts police from where they are needed (Palmary 2002). Moreover, the general 
ineffectiveness of such policing strategies is leading citizens to accept criminal activity as part of 
their social landscape. Many South Africans we have interviewed, for example, no longer 
classify mugging as crime unless it involved the use of a firearm. In this context, people are 
seeking alternative means to manage crime. In cases, this includes turning to groups like Mapogo 
a Mathamaga, a national investigation and ‘goods recovery’ company that works largely outside 
the law, but regularly draws on police information and backup.23 These linkages ‘delegalise’ the 
criminal justice system, robbing the state of one of its most primitive functions and placing all of 
urbanites at risk. 
The arrest of people trading on the street—whether South African or foreign—or 
conducting other small business also affects the livelihoods of those arrested and their 
                                                     
23 Interview with Cecil van Schalwyk, Director of Midrand office of Mapogo a Mathamaga, 25 July 2003. 
48 
 
dependents. Cities must promote entry into trading markets rather than close this avenue to those 
who have few other options, a category of people well represented in inner-city Johannesburg. 
For migrants who lack the documentation or capital to find work in the formal sector—despite 
many having skills to make contributions in this area—regularly targeting this subset of the 
population for by-law infractions only drives trade further underground and increases the 
likelihood that they will turn to irregular, illegal, or dangerous economic activities. The kind of 
corruption and informal vigilantism seen against migrants in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and 
elsewhere across the country also presents a fundamental challenge to South Africa’s legitimacy 
and risk institutionalizing patterns of violence and corruption in essential state agencies and 
departments.  
South Africa’s economic and political success hinges on accountable institutions that 
foster a set of overlapping goals among city residents. Discrimination based on national or 
community origins, like other arbitrary forms of exclusion, undermines this objective in two 
primary ways. First, for reasons discussed above, people who do not feel welcome in South 
Africa’s urban society are less likely to respect the rules and institutions dedicated to governing 
it. This may become visible in efforts to dodge taxes regulations, avoid census takers, or actively 
subvert regulatory agencies they feel are more likely to prey on than promote their interests. 
When not given the rights to work or documents needed to secure housing, it may also result in 
building hijackings, criminal activity, or other anti-social behaviours. Those who feel excluded 
are also unlikely to participate in participatory planning exercises (e.g., the integrated 
development planning process (IDP)). Such self-exclusion makes government policies all the 
less likely to address city residents’ priorities and needs and may, in time, harm public 
institutions’ efficacy and legitimacy (see Winkler 2006).  
There are also broader issues at stake regarding the relationships among residents and 
both local and national government. As a senior strategist for the City of Johannesburg noted in 
an informal discussion with us, ‘The legitimacy of the South African government is founded on 
overturning past patterns of discrimination and exclusion. We have a proactive responsibility to 
absorb the poor and promote social mobility.’ For him, and a few others at elite levels of local 
government, refugees, immigrants, and migrants are simply another category of the vulnerable 
and poor. Indeed, it is just such a position taken by Johannesburg’s Human Development 
Strategy. The ability of Johannesburg to implement such a programme is, in the words of the 
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same official, critical to the ‘integrity of the city.’ As the Mayor of Johannesburg recently stated, 
‘It’s an issue that you can’t ignore’ (Reuters 2006).  
However, continued anti-foreigner sentiments and scapegoating risk challenging cities’ 
legitimacy and their ability to establish accountable, socially embedded institutions. In the words 
of one immigrant now living in Johannesburg:  
 
...Rumours are continuously spread by everyone that foreigners are 
responsible for whatever is wrong. It is like, ‘Thank you, foreigners, that you 
are here, now we can blame you for everything. South Africans do not look at 
their own – they just ignore their own problems and pretend that foreigners 
cause all their problems.24 
 
Although such attitudes are not universal, the presence of a convenient scapegoat prevents South 
Africans from holding their public institutions responsible for their shortcomings and failed 
promises. Although there have only been few instances in which local politicians have overtly 
manipulated an immigrant or migrant presence for electoral gain, there is a spectre of the kind of 
public political scapegoating seen in Europe and elsewhere in a context where recourse to 
political violence is much more common.  
 
The Strengths and Limits of a Policy Based on Expanding Capabilities  
 
Reflecting its ambiguous position as a relatively liberal, middle-income country in close 
proximity to some of the world’s poorest states, South African responses to migration and 
displacement represent an uneasy and unsustainable hybrid of rights and restrictions. On one 
hand, the country grants refugees the freedom to move within the country but the quest to control 
undocumented migrants means they can not do so without constant fear of harassment, arrest, 
and deportation. More importantly, by developing an approach that aims to improve the 
entitlements and capabilities of all residents, regardless of their origin, South Africa will be 
better equipped to address unemployment, insecurity, and inequality. The failure to do so—and 
                                                     
24 Quotation from Beal, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002: 124. 
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the benefits of a successful policy—will be most evident in the country’s urban centres, where 
the majority of refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants reside.  
The remainder of this report considers how South Africa’s approach to migration and 
asylum can draw guidance from the capability approach, a framework most notably and 
articulately promoted by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. This approach—discussed in more 
detail below—is at once universalistic and highly contextualized. In all instances, it is dedicated 
to expanding agency—the ability to choose different ways of living—while ensuring that 
fundamental prerequisites for survival are never compromised.  
If effectively implemented, such a policy would help move discussions of migration 
policy beyond dominant security and welfarist frameworks. By focusing on individual agency 
and welfare, it should also draw attention to heterogeneity and spatial dynamics described in the 
previous pages. Perhaps most importantly, the language of capability expansion avoids pitting 
migrants’ rights and entitlements against those of host communities. By emphasizing that 
improving migrant welfare is coterminous with expanding choices and control for all residents 
avoids the implication that migrants are getting something that rightfully belongs to others. It 
also helps to naturalise their presence rather than conceptually alienate them through legal action 
or welfarism.  
So what would a capabilities approach to migration policy look like? We can begin with 
Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICPR) that argues all 
people have the right to recognition as a person before the law. From the UNHCR’s discussion 
of basic legal protection, we can add, inter alia, physical security; avoidance of torture or 
refoulement; and an adequate and dignified means of subsistence. Not only are these basic 
capabilities central to human survival, but key to the exercise of agency. The latter point—a 
focus on livelihoods—is both critical and controversial. In the highly dynamic South African 
cities, a dignified means of subsistence is more than simple handouts or meeting basic nutritional 
needs, but also includes the flexibility to move, change employment, and invest in ways that can 
lead to a dignified life; or, at least, a life of comparable dignity to those around you. This 
flexibility also requires that we develop intervention strategies premised on individuals’ skills 
and ambitions not only on the narrow definition of skills defined by the Government or business. 
It is here that we are drawn to Nussbaum and Sen’s work on capabilities.  
In the opening sentence of Development as Freedom, Sen (1999:3) writes that, 
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‘Development can be seen [. . .] as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.’ 
As such, we should measure policy success by the ability to progressively expand the 
opportunities (i.e., capabilities) they have for people to achieve their heterogeneous objectives. 
This will not guarantee prosperity for migrants, but provides them with the opportunities to 
maximise their values (See Sen 1985: 18-20). Such a policy imagines migrants as effective 
agents in their own welfare who—like other potentially vulnerable groups—may require 
assistance to overcome internal and external obstacles limiting their capabilities.  
 The first step in implementing such a policy is finding ways of improving documentation 
and legal status. In the first instance this should be about creating new mechanism for people to 
migrate legally to South Africa. This could include a range of options such as job-seeker permits 
or a more comprehensive SADC free movement protocol. Ideally, the government should 
eventually expand this initiative to regularise all people currently within South Africa. Although 
not a guarantee of capability expansion, legal status and documentation are critical to welfare 
and security: theoretically enabling access to employment and protecting against abuse at the 
hands of police. Almost five years ago, Durban was among the first municipalities to register 
street traders regardless of national or legal status. This provided a modicum of protection but the 
provision of documents is not enough. To promote migrants’ full economic participation, any 
intervention must also include training relevant officials to recognize and respect these forms of 
documentation and supporting disciplinary action against those who do not. Even when such 
documentation provides only limited protection or access to services, documentation can help 
promote an objective and consistent regulatory system that may ultimately enhance opportunities 
for all residents. Certainly, increased reliance on documentation can help fight corruption within 
the state and private bureaucracy. 
 The second phase should focus on qualifications and skills training. As noted earlier, 
many migrants to South Africa have professional credentials and qualifications that are not 
recognized by national authorities or professional associations in asylum countries. For example, 
while South Africa faces an acute nursing shortage, thousands of refugee nurses remain 
unemployed because they cannot prove their qualifications. In other instances, a minimal degree 
of special training can be provided that will allow migrants to upgrade or adapt their existing 
qualifications in ways that will contribute to South Africa’s overall welfare.  
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 The success of the priorities outlined above depends on a level of awareness and 
compliance within the public and private sectors. As described elsewhere, there are significant 
knowledge gaps among officials, employers, and landlords regarding the rights of non-nationals 
within South Africa. Much as ‘fair play’ is a critical component of administrative justice and 
capability expansion, efforts must be made to limit the discrimination non-nationals face in 
accessing services, jobs, and accommodation. 
 Perhaps the most controversial recommendation for enacting a capabilities approach is 
the requirement for political participation. Political participation is not only a value in its own 
right, but is critical to the universal expansion of capabilities (see Sen 1999). If we accept that 
migrants’ intentions and actions affect the communities in which they live, then we should also 
facilitate a role in influencing official policymaking. Policies formed without accurately 
assessing the interests and capabilities of all affected are unlikely to achieve their intended 
outcomes. More fundamentally, opportunities for participation are also critical in fostering the 
sense of community needed to expand economic opportunities across communities. Formal 
exclusion from participatory processes only encourages socio-political divides between citizens 
and non-nationals (see Amisi and Ballard 2005;  
Mang’ana 2004). Certain forms of political participation should probably be reserved for citizens 
(e.g., the right to elect leaders), but migrants may nonetheless be provided substantive 
opportunities to influence the policies directly affecting them. If the goal of government is to 
expand the capabilities of all people—to provide services, promote health, security, and 
prosperity—policies must be formulated with a comprehensive understanding of all residents.  
Although largely convinced by its principles, there are at least four reasons to question its 
practicality in contemporary South Africa. First, given the current political climate, it will be 
difficult to garner support for any effort seen as promoting foreigners’ welfare or socio-political 
incorporation. Even where migrants are technically able to participate in public planning 
mechanisms–chambers of commerce, community policing forums, or government run integrated 
planning processes (IDPs)—they are often overtly excluded or marginalised by South African 
participants. Second, a capabilities approach depends heavily on institutions to ensure and 
promote basic rights. Without access to even basic legal protections or physical security, such 
strategies are unlikely to succeed. Third, and more fundamentally, we must explicitly recognise 
the limited impact of official policymaking. As described in the pages above, many of the factors 
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affecting migrants’ lives and livelihoods take place outside the state. These include the denial of 
housing, labour exploitation, and violence. While the state ostensibly has a role in countering 
these trends, officials have been either unwilling or unable to do so. In many instances, they play 
an active role in corrupt or extra-legal practices. Lastly, South Africa faces what is often termed 
mixed flows of migrants. While a developmental approach may effectively assist voluntary or 
labour migrants, a more interventionist and welfarist approach may be needed for those fleeing 
violence, persecution, or natural disasters. With no effective way of distinguishing these 
populations, the latter group’s vulnerabilities are likely to go unaddressed.  
 An approach premised on gradually expanding capabilities through engagement with host 
communities’ economic and social process also presumes migrants’ desire for such integration. 
As discussed above, many migrants (international and migrants) see their current place of 
residence as a site of profit and passage. For those displaced by war or conflict, they may only be 
seeking temporary protection. Rather than make social or economic investments, they instead try 
to extract and accumulate with the idea of quickly moving on or remitting money to family and 
friends elsewhere. Indeed, many migrants actively position themselves on margins of host 
communities’ where they can benefit from economic opportunities without being bound by 
social or political obligation (see Landau and Monson 2008). Undoubtedly, a friendlier policy 
framework would encourage many people to invest in the areas in which they live. However, 
such interests cannot be presumed.  
 
Conclusions and Steps Forward 
 
There is little definite or final to say about migration and development in South and 
Southern Africa. Population movements and their consequences are equally the result of long-
term global and local political transformations and unpredictable natural and political crises. 
With elections around the corner, policy responses to migration are equally uncertain. However, 
in the midst of global economic crisis and populist pressures on whatever government is elected 
in 2009, it is unlikely that policy reforms will achieve positive, long-term, and regional 
development outcomes. If they do, it will be a result of good fortune instead of good planning.  
In such a context, a report of this kind can only end by raising issues that will—or 
should-- shape population and political dynamics and responses to them. To that end, there is a 
54 
 
need to rethink three divisions: between documented and undocumented migrants; between 
voluntary and forced migrants; and between international and domestic migration. As elsewhere 
in the world, these are analytical categories that are closely tied with specific legislations and 
implementing bodies. This has tended to produce policy silos with little coordination among 
agencies charged with law enforcement, status determination, documentation, social assistance, 
or local development. In almost no instances do such firm distinctions make logical sense. This 
is all the more so in South Africa where there are mixed migration flows and few bureaucratic 
mechanisms to distinguish among the various migrant categories. If there is to be substantive and 
effective reform in any one of these areas – asylum, migration, border management, or urban 
development– all must be considered together as part of a national and regional policy 
framework to address human mobility. In January 2009, Gauteng Province’s Department of 
Local Government convened a special seminar on ‘migration mainstreaming’ that seeks to 
address just these concerns. While innovative and the first such initiative for the country’s most 
migrant rich province, many of the proposed measures rely on highly sophisticated collection, 
dissemination, and use of statistics that are yet unavailable. A more immediately feasible 
proposal includes regular coordination meetings that would bring together senior officials from 
across local government to review broad migration trends, identify information paucities, and 
consider potential mechanisms for incorporating migration into their annual and long-term plans. 
There is also a need to introduce a spatial component in considering future policy 
directions. Perhaps more than many policy areas, national governments are automatically 
assigned comprehensive responsibility for matters affecting immigration and emigration. While 
national government has an important role, there is a need to move beyond the nation state 
framework. Migration’s most immediate effects are felt locally in both sending and receiving 
communities. Local government must necessarily be involved to ensure that these effects are 
developmentally positive. Moreover, because migration involves at least two distinct geographic 
locales, the developmental effects are, by definition, regional. As such, both analysis and policy 
debates must work towards a regional approach. What we must now begin is a new spatial 
analysis of migration that breaks from a long-standing epistemological nationalism. Any 
discussion of migration and development should hereafter consider local, national, and regional 
impacts and policy options.  
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In considering the possibility for positive policy reform, we must also consider the policy 
climate and institutional frameworks present in South and Southern Africa. As detailed above, 
the South African Department of Home Affairs has shown little interest or ability in developing 
and implementing sound and effective migration policy. Elsewhere in government, there has 
been little planning or consideration of human mobility both domestic and international. As such, 
there is little reason to believe that South Africa will independently shift its current security and 
control based policies towards ones that are more developmentally oriented. At the local and 
regional levels, the capacity to evaluate, monitor, and address migration is almost totally absent. 
A small number of municipalities have begun to recognize human mobility as a significant issue 
but few have undertaken substantive initiatives to address it. While the Southern African 
Development Community’s secretariat is ostensibly responsible for developing a regional 
approach to migration, there is no one in the secretariat specifically charged with migration 
matters. Even were these bodies to develop effective policy, the inability to implement them will 
also mean that the effects may be more negative than positive.  
We must also question the role that non-African actors are playing in pushing particular 
policy agendas. Although the International Organisation for Migration has played a positive role 
in training officials and assisting in the repatriation of refugees, their hyperbolic anti-trafficking 
agenda has helped ensure that migration continues to be framed as a humanitarian or law-
enforcement—and not development—concern. Despite the relatively few people affected by the 
horrors of human trafficking, the IOM and its partners have managed to push for policy reform 
while the faulty asylum system remains relatively untouched.  
The European Union is also playing an important if more sophisticated role in South 
Africa’s immigration regime. Through political dialogues and ‘capacity-building’, they are 
gradually winning allies in their ongoing campaign to legitimise tightened border controls. This 
has both immediate and long-term benefits to the European Union. In the short-term, it helps 
prevent people from using South Africa as a springboard into the European Union. Although the 
numbers following this route are relatively small, corruption within South Africa’s Department 
of Home Affairs and relatively lax visa requirements for South Africans travelling to Europe 
(particularly those heading towards the United Kingdom), mean that South Africa is a frequent 
point of transit for Africans and Asians with intentions of onward travel. Over time, the 
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European Union’s hope might be to strengthen South Africa’s border control ethos so as to 
ensure support for its restrictive immigration measures within international policy fora.  
Third, this paper argues that global debates over governance and development have much 
to offer South Africa as it grapples with future migration policy directions. With a move away 
from singularly prescriptive approach to governance, the UNDP’s 1997 Human Development 
concept, the European Commission’s 2006 Strategic Paper on Governance, and even the World 
Bank Group’s Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) suggest the need to 
develop policies based on a country’s specificities. This suggests the need for a South (and 
Southern) Africa migration management system that considers the region’s population dynamics, 
economic needs, and institutional capacities. But as domestic and international support grows for 
supporting the governance of service delivery, migration continues to be governed largely as a 
security concern divorced from the broader social and economic issues with which it intersects. 
If nothing else, this report suggests that foreign assistance and domestic policy reforms push for 
‘migration mainstreaming’ into all aspects of governance. In a country where international and 
domestic mobility remains so demographically and politically important, the success of any 
development initiative must overtly consider the country’s population dynamics. As part of this 
process, the government should identify and understand the root causes of the negative by-
products of human mobility–corruption, human rights abuses, labour competition—and begin 
developing ways to help reduce them rather than rely on the fantasy that it should and can totally 
control mobility itself. 
Lastly, any effort to incorporate migration into long-term policy and governance process 
will require better data and integration of data into planning processes. This will become 
particularly important as South Africa embraces a spatial development model. As this report 
demonstrates, foreigners’ presence and responses to outsiders may be driven by global processes 
but must be understood within specific, highly localized contexts. While it is useful to develop 
aggregated trends, reactions and attitudes may be shaped by the particular racial, economic, and 
political history of a single neighbourhood. All this will require heightening capacity for 
statistical, institutional, and social analyses. While this is critical at the national level, all spheres 
of government should be encouraged to collaborate and develop the capacity for data collection 
and analysis at all levels. Lastly, mechanisms should be created to ensure that these analyses—if 
they eventually become available—are fed into decision-making processes. Doing otherwise will 
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ensure policy failure and may help realize many planners’ current fears about the effects of 
human mobility on prosperity, security, and development. 
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